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Investor Rights Symposium  
Introduction                  
The Elusive Balance Between Investor  
Protection and Wealth Creation 
Barbara Black* and Jill Gross** 
The enactment of federal securities legislation in the 1930s codified 
the principle that investors should be shielded from securities fraud, but 
scholars and policymakers continue to debate the appropriate balance 
between protecting investors and encouraging capital formation.  
Congressional activity of the past decade reflects this tension.  In the 
1990s, Congress enacted two major pieces of legislation to restrict 
securities fraud class actions because of its belief that frivolous class 
actions were a drain on entrepreneurism.1 In 2002, after the 
Enron/WorldCom et al. corporate scandals, reflecting perhaps a sense 
that the earlier legislation had tipped the pendulum too far, Congress 
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) with its wide-ranging reforms to 
improve corporate reporting and investor decision-making.2 
The Pace Investor Rights Project (PIRP), launched in the fall of 
20033 as an expansion of Pace Law School’s ground-breaking Securities 
 
* James D. Hopkins Professor of Law, Director of Research, Pace Investor Rights Project, 
Pace University School of Law.  B.A. Barnard; J.D. Columbia. 
** Associate Professor of Law, Director of Advocacy, Pace Investor Rights Project, Pace 
University School of Law.  A.B. Cornell; J.D. Harvard. 
1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
109 Stat. 737; Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 
112 Stat. 3227. 
2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
7201-7266 (2005) (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and Corporate 
Responsibility). 
3. In the spring of 2003, New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer settled an 
enforcement action brought under the Martin Act, New York’s securities statute, 
involving allegations of  “IPO spinning” against a chief executive officer of a public 
company.  See Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General, Telecom 
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Arbitration Clinic,4 seeks to foster increased scholarly interest on topics 
related to investor justice in the regulatory, arbitral and judicial arenas.  
The Project thus produced the Investor Rights Symposium, which took 
place on the grounds of the Judicial Institute at Pace Law School on 
March 31 and April 1, 2005, to bring together academics, regulators, 
practitioners, investors’ advocates and students to explore the precarious 
balance between investor protection and wealth creation.  The 
scholarship that follows in this volume reflects the academic and critical 
thoughts of six authors who explore through different lenses the various 
obstacles to optimal investor protection in the securities industry. 
Securities Regulation 
Professor David S. Ruder5 kicked off the Symposium with a 
keynote speech presenting his thoughts on the SEC’s dual role of 
protecting investors and facilitating wealth creation by maintaining the 
 
Executive Agrees to Give Up IPO Profits (May 13, 2003), http://www.oag. 
state.ny.us/press/2003/may/may13b_03.html. As part of the settlement, the CEO agreed 
to donate $200,000 to Pace University School of Law to support programs of the 
Securities Arbitration Clinic (SAC).  Pace’s SAC used this grant money to launch PIRP, 
an expansion of the clinic designed to promote advocacy, research and educational 
programs in the area of investor justice.  See Press Release, Pace Law School, Pace Law 
School Received $200,000 Grant to Launch the Pace   Investor Rights Project (Sept. 8, 
2003), http://www.law.pace.edu/news/2003/SAC-Sept-2003.html.  We conceived and 
implemented PIRP due to our perception that no organization advocated for the legal 
rights of small, individual investors. 
4. In the fall of 1997, Professor Black founded SAC, the first such clinic in the 
nation, in response to an initiative by then Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
Chairman Arthur Levitt to provide free representation to small investors who had 
arbitrable disputes with their brokerage firms and could not otherwise obtain 
representation due to the small size of their claims.  Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces 
Pilot Securities Arbitration Clinic to Help Small Investors—Levitt Responds to Concerns 
Voiced at Town Meetings (Nov. 12, 1997), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/ 
pressarchive/1997/97-101.txt.  Chairman Levitt’s focus on investor protection alerted him 
to the lack of fairness in arbitration because small investors, whose claims were too small 
to make it cost-effective for a lawyer to take the case, were faring poorly without legal 
representation.  He concluded that one solution was to use the vehicle of the law school 
clinic to deliver legal services to these small investors.  Id.  The authors currently are co-
directors of the clinic.  Since it opened its doors, SAC has represented more than 30 
clients, and has obtained recoveries for its clients through awards and settlements totaling 
more than $300,000.  For a more extensive description of the history and early years of 
Pace’s clinic, see Barbara Black, Establishing a Securities Arbitration Clinic: The 
Experience at Pace, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 35 (2000). 
5. William W. Gurley Memorial Professor of Law, Northwestern University School 
of Law.  Professor Ruder was Chair of the SEC from 1987-89. 
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integrity of the capital markets.6  Professor Ruder examined in detail 
whether the SEC accounts for and appropriately balances these 
competing considerations in the performance of its various functions, 
including its rulemaking, enforcement, oversight of securities self-
regulatory organizations (SROs), market regulation and investor 
education functions.7  He concluded that the SEC’s pursuit of investor 
protection is aligned with the interests of capital formation because 
“honest” markets are the best markets.8  If investors know they will not 
be defrauded, the cost of capital will be lower as there will be no reason 
to discount for potential dishonesty. 
Professor Thomas R. Hurst9 examined the recent regulatory 
approach to investor protection by reviewing the noteworthy reforms 
implemented by the SEC in the wake of the mutual funds scandals of 
2003 and 2004,10 but concluded that much remains to be done.11  Mutual 
fund expenses remain high, and disclosure of mutual fund expenses is 
obtuse and incomplete.  Low-cost index funds constitute only about ten 
percent of mutual fund assets, despite widespread publicity about their 
benefits. 
Professor James J. Fishman12 commented that most mutual fund 
abuse is in the asset-gathering phase rather than the trading decision 
phase, so the greatest need for investor education is in the area of 
choosing funds wisely.  He suggested more standardized presentations of 
criteria such as costs, performance, and allocations. 
These criticisms confirm our own observations in the Securities 
Arbitration Clinic, where we have noted that many of our small-investor 
clients are placed in a variety of expensive mutual funds.  We suspect 
this demonstrates the conflict of interest between customer suitability 
and brokers’ incentives to sell certain products.  In fact, Professor Hurst 
called for sales practice reform requiring brokers to disclose all 
 
6. David S. Ruder, Keynote Speech: Balancing Investor Protections and Capital 
Market Operation, 26 PACE L. REV. 39 (2005). 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Sam T. Dell Research Scholar Professor, University of Florida, Fredric G. Levin 
College of Law. 
10. These scandals included allegations of late-trading and market-timing in 
enforcement actions brought by the SEC and the New York State Attorney General’s 
Office against several mutual fund companies. 
11. Thomas R. Hurst, The Unfinished Business of Mutual Fund Reform, 26 PACE L. 
REV. 133 (2005). 
12. Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. 
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compensation they receive from selling funds.13  In our opinion, many 
investors would be better served if, rather than seeking the services of a 
broker-dealer, they consulted a fee-paid investment adviser and 
purchased low-cost funds on their own.  As Professor Hurst wondered, 
how can regulators increase the pressure on broker-dealers to make better 
mutual fund selections for their customers?14 
Securities Arbitration 
As for the arbitration arena, Professor Ruder thought the SEC was 
on the “wrong side” of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,15 overruling long-
standing precedent and holding that federal securities law claims were 
arbitrable.16  However, he noted that there has been considerable reform 
of the SRO securities arbitration process to protect investors,17 including 
the development of a strong claimants’ bar.18  As a result, Professor 
 
13. Hurst, supra note 11. 
14. Id. 
15. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). In McMahon, the SEC filed a brief as amicus curiae 
urging reversal of the Court of Appeals’ holding that federal securities law claims were 
not arbitrable.  The SEC argued that the 1975 amendments to the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 gave it extensive authority to ensure the fairness of securities arbitration.  Id. 
at 233-34. 
16. For a more extensive discussion of the significance of McMahon, see Barbara 
Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities 
Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991 (2002).  Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote the 
dissenting opinion; for an assessment from the vantage point of his law clerk at the time, 
see James A. Fanto, Justice Blackmun and Securities Arbitration: McMahon Revisited, 
71 N.D. L. REV. 145 (1995). 
17. Many of the reforms have been the result of Professor Ruder’s work in chairing 
an Arbitration Policy Task Force appointed by the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD) in 1994, which resulted in the report widely known as the “Ruder 
Report.”  See SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM: REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY 
TASK FORCE TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES 
DEALERS, INC. (1996). 
18. The Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association (PIABA) is “a national bar 
association whose member attorneys are dedicated to the representation of investors in 
disputes with the securities industry.” PIABA Home Page, https://secure.piaba.org/ 
piabaweb/html/index.php (last visited Sept. 7, 2005).  
The mission of PIABA is to promote the interests of the public investor in 
securities and commodities arbitration by protecting public investors from 
abuses in the arbitration process, such as those associated with document 
production and discovery; making securities and commodities arbitration as 
just and fair as systematically possible; and creating a level playing field for the 
public investor in securities and commodities arbitration.   
See About PIABA, https://secure.piaba.org/piabaweb/html/modules.php?op=modload 
BLACK AND GROSS 27_38 2/1/2006 5:09 PM 
2005] ELUSIVE BALANCE 31 
Ruder believes that securities arbitration currently is fair to investors.19  
He did express concerns, however, that arbitration awards lack 
precedential value,20 and thus the law governing broker-dealers’ duties to 
their customers has not been developing since McMahon.21 
Certain investors’ advocates have challenged Professor Ruder’s 
view that securities arbitration is fair to investors and have called for 
changes in the process.22  Some of those views were expressed to a 
House of Representatives subcommittee who, about the time of the 
Symposium, conducted a hearing to review the securities arbitration 
process.23  In addition, the SROs are continually reviewing their 
arbitration procedures and proposing rule changes to improve the process 
for investors.24 
At our Symposium, two scholars presented proposals for securities 
arbitration reform. Professor Sarah Rudolph Cole25 presented her 
 
&name=Sections&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=56&page=1 (last visited Nov. 18, 
2005). 
19. See David S. Ruder, Elements of a Fair and Efficient Securities Arbitration 
System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1101, 1108 (1998) (arguing that securities arbitration “provides 
clear and significant advantages over the civil litigation system”); David S. Ruder, 
Securities Arbitration in the Public Interest: The Role of Punitive Damages, 92 NW. U. L. 
REV. 69, 74 (1997) (“[A]ctive SEC oversight of the SRO arbitration system . . . is an 
essential ingredient in assuring a securities arbitration system in the public interest.”); see 
also Barbara Black, The Eighth James D. Hopkins Lecture: Is Securities Arbitration Fair 
to Investors?, 25 PACE L. REV. 1 (2004) (concluding that securities arbitration is a fair 
alternative to courts for investors). 
20. See, e.g., IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 136 F.3d 537, 543 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (“[A]rbitrators’ decisions are not intended to have precedential effect even in 
arbitration unless given that effect by contract, let alone in the courts.”). 
21. See Black & Gross, supra note 16, at 1013-26. 
22. See, e.g., A Review of the Securities Arbitration System: Hearing Before the 
U.S. H. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored 
Enterprises, 109th Cong. (Mar. 17, 2005) (testimony of William Francis Galvin), 
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/031705wfg.pdf. 
23. See A Review of the Securities Arbitration System: Hearing Before the U.S. H. 
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, 109th 
Cong. (Mar. 17, 2005), http://financialservices.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode 
=detail&hearing=362&comm=1 (speakers included representatives of the NASD and 
NYSE arbitration forums and the securities industry, investors’ advocates, and 
academics). 
24. See, e.g., Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities 
Dealers; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 
Thereto to Amend NASD Arbitration Rules for Customer Disputes, 70 Fed. Reg. 36,442 
(June 23, 2005) (soliciting public comment on proposed rule change to revise arbitration 
code governing customer disputes to make code more understandable for investors). 
25. Professor of Law, The Ohio State University, Michael E. Moritz College of 
Law. 
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analysis that securities arbitration entails state action and thus requires 
due process protections,26 while Professor Peter Bowman Rutledge27 
proposed to eliminate arbitrators’ immunity.28  Professor Cole’s analysis 
is constitutionally-based and advocates reforms that more closely equate 
arbitration with a judicial proceeding, while Professor Rutledge proposes 
a market-based solution that equates arbitrators with professionals with 
an interest in marketing their services. 
Both scholars’ reformist idealism necessarily is tempered a bit by 
practical realities.  Although Professor Cole’s state action argument is 
more persuasive when applied to intra-industry arbitrations; as a practical 
matter, if her argument prevails, the same due process protections are 
likely to be added for customer arbitrations as well, since neither SRO 
could justify a fairer procedure just for the industry.  Moreover, as 
Professor Maureen Arellano Weston29 commented, while Professor 
Rutledge accurately points out that the lack of arbitrator accountability is 
a serious problem, especially with the explosive growth of arbitration, 
she does not believe that contractual immunity is workable as investors 
have no negotiation power.  She thus advocated for qualified immunity 
of arbitrators, allowing liability only for gross negligence.30 
Finally, both reform proposals share a common laudable goal—to 
provide incentives for arbitrators to exercise more care in deciding cases.  
In particular, Professors Cole and Rutledge both advocate reasoned 
awards31 and favor NASD’s recent rule proposal to require arbitrators to 
provide reasons for their awards at the request of the customer.32  While 
we have serious reservations about NASD’s proposal, Professor Cole 
supplies the most compelling argument for reasoned awards through her 
 
26. Sarah Rudolph Cole, Fairness in Securities Arbitration: A Constitutional 
Mandate?, 26 PACE L. REV. 73 (2005). 
27. Assistant Professor, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of 
Law. 
28. Peter B. Rutledge, Market Solutions to Market Problems: Re-Examining 
Arbitral Immunity as a Solution to Unfairness in Securities Arbitration, 26 PACE L. REV. 
113 (2005). 
29. Associate Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law. 
30. Maureen Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Professional 
and Mandatory Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449 (2004). 
31. See Cole, supra note 26; Rutledge, supra note 28. 
32. See NASD, Proposed Rule Change to Provide Written Explanations in 
Arbitration Awards Upon the Request of Customers or Associated Persons, Amendment 
No. 1, File No. SR-NASD-2005-032, http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService 
=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDocName=NASDW_013542 (last visited Sept. 7, 2005).  For 
customer disputes, industry parties will not have the same right to request arbitrators to 
include written explanations in their awards. 
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discussion of the cognitive psychology-based thought processes of 
arbitrators.33 
In a robust defense of the NASD forum, George H. Friedman34 
respectfully disagreed with Professor Cole’s theory that there is state 
action in securities arbitration.  He also argued that, even if there were 
state action, the forum contains all requisite due process protections and 
NASD-DR arbitration is fair as a matter of law and fact. He does 
recognize that more empirical data is necessary to determine whether 
parties want more professional arbitrators35—and to confirm his view 
that securities arbitration is a fair process.36  The authors have embarked 
on just such a study, with results expected in early 2006.37 
Common Law 
Focusing on investor rights in the judicial arena, Professor Francis J. 
Facciolo38 traced the complex and somewhat contingent origins of the 
duty of best execution,39 noting that it evolved largely through SEC 
activism in creating the shingle theory.40  Professor James A. Fanto41 
 
33. Cole, supra note 26, at 107-08.  For a fuller explanation of our reservations 
about the NASD’s “explained awards” proposal, see Comment Letter from Jill Gross, 
Barbara Black & Melanie Serkin, PIRP, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, SEC (Aug. 5, 2005), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/nasd2005032/bblack6853.pdf. 
34. Executive Vice President and Director of Dispute Resolution of NASD Dispute 
Resolution, Inc. (“NASD-DR”). 
35. See Barbara Black, Do We Expect Too Much From NASD Arbitrators?, 2004 
SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR No. 7, 1 (Oct. 2004). 
36. See George H. Friedman, The Level Playing Field, XI SEC. ARB. 
COMMENTATOR  No. 12, 1 (July 2001). 
37. Specifically, in response to a 2002 recommendation by Michael A. Perino, 
Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law (see Michael A. Perino, Report to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission Regarding Arbitrator Conflict Disclosure 
Requirements in NASD and NYSE Securities Arbitrations, at 5 (Nov. 2, 2002), 
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/arbconflict.pdf), the Securities Industry Conference on 
Arbitration (SICA) has commissioned us to conduct an empirical study of the fairness of 
securities arbitration.  Our study will explore, in particular, investors’ perceptions of the 
fairness of arbitration and whether arbitrators appear competent to resolve their customer 
disputes. See Thirteenth Report of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration, at 8 
(Oct. 2005), http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/SICA2005.pdf. 
38. Assistant Professor, St. John’s University School of Law. 
39. The duty of best execution refers to the duty by a broker to seek out the best 
price, time and market for his or her client’s trade. 
40. Francis J. Facciolo, A Broker’s Duty of Best Execution in the Nineteenth and 
Early Twentieth Centuries, 26 PACE L. REV. 155 (2005). 
41. Professor and Associate Director, Center for the Study of International Business 
Law, Brooklyn Law School. 
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astutely observed that the SEC’s successful performance as a “legal 
entrepreneur” should send signals to the private bar about available legal 
theories that investors’ advocates can pursue to protect investors’ rights.  
In the end, Professor Fanto noted, it will take a combination of 
government regulation and increased court receptivity to novel (and not 
so novel) legal theories to maximize investors’ rights. 
Unfortunately, in our view, the reality is that judges have not made 
it easy for investors to sue their investment professionals for 
misconduct.42  Courts impose a heavy burden on investors to demonstrate 
that they acted reasonably and thus were entitled to trust their broker.43  
Moreover, since McMahon, there are few opportunities for a reform-
minded judge to advance investor protection in this area, thus making it 
unlikely that such court receptivity is forthcoming. 
Investor Backlash 
With the perspective of several months, the Investor Rights 
Symposium seems very well timed.  By the spring of 2005, it was 
abundantly clear that a backlash against investor protection efforts was 
underway.  The corporate community was strident in its insistence that 
SOX reforms to improve financial reporting were too costly to 
implement and were forcing some issuers to opt out of the public 
market.44  The expensing of stock options, a major initiative of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board, was stalled.45  The SEC was 
subjected to ongoing criticism, including from two of its own 
Commissioners,46 and litigation47 over two of its reforms—the 
 
42. See Black & Gross, supra note 16, at 1035-47; Marc I. Steinberg, Securities 
Arbitration: Better for Investors Than the Courts?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1503 (1996). 
43. See Black & Gross, supra note 16, at 1037-38. 
44. See, e.g., Karen Richardson & Diya Gullapalli, Next SEC Chief Faces Full 
Plate of Issues, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2005, at A4 (“[C]ompanies of all stripes have railed 
against the time and expense of preparing internal-control reports, even as hundreds of 
companies have identified deficiencies in the systems they have in place to prevent 
accounting shenanigans.”). 
45. Id. (“[M]any companies, particularly those in Silicon Valley, still argue against 
options expensing, and they have a number of Washington politicians on their side.”); see 
also Jonathan Weil, Companies Get Reprieve on Expensing Options, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
13, 2005, at C3. 
46. See, e.g., Letter from Commissioners Glassman and Atkins re: Staff Report on 
the Exemptive Rule Amendments of 2004: The Independent Chair Condition (Apr. 29, 
2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch050205cagpsa.htm (criticizing SEC staff 
report because it provides no justification for the independent chair rule); Paul A. Atkins, 
Speech by SEC Commissioner: Remarks Before the SIA Industry Leadership Luncheon 
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registration of advisers to private hedge funds48 and the requirement that 
mutual funds have boards with no less than 75% independent directors 
and independent chairs.49  A modest SEC proposal to allow shareholders 
the power to nominate directors in limited circumstances50 was declared 
“dead” in the face of assertions that it would cause disruption within 
corporate boardrooms.51  Finally, the concerns of investors’ advocates 
intensified with the ominous resignation of SEC Chair William 
Donaldson and President Bush’s nomination of Representative 
Christopher Cox, who, it is widely reported,52 played an important role in 
the enactment of PSLRA. 
The backlash did not play out simply in the political arena.  The 
consensus among federal appeals courts53 is that the longer statute of 
 
(June 8, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch060805psa.htm (referring to the 
hedge fund and the independent chair rules as reflecting “a puzzling willingness to 
undertake sweeping regulatory actions without adequate justification”).  Another 
Commissioner, Roel Campos, was quoted as wondering: “Is it possible to have reform—
in terms of regulation—if it affects and hurts a particular industry that has significant 
lobbying power?  Can any regulation or reform survive under our system?” See Richard 
Hill, Campos Considers Viability of Rules in Era of Lobbying, SEC. L. DAILY, Mar. 18, 
2005. 
47. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce sued the SEC asserting it had no authority to 
adopt the independent chair rule.  In June 2005 the D.C. Circuit held that the SEC had the 
authority to promulgate the rule, but its failure to consider the costs of the rule violated 
the Administrative Procedure Act.  Chamber of Commerce of the United States of 
America v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  On Chair Donaldson’s last day at the 
SEC, it voted, again by a 3-2 vote, not to modify the rule. Press Release 2005-99, SEC, 
SEC Votes to Adopt Securities Act Rule Reform and Shell Company Regulations; 
Considers Matters Remanded by the Court of Appeals (July 1, 2005), http:// 
www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-99.htm.  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce sued again.  
See Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. SEC, 2005 LEXIS 19602 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (denying petition for a rehearing); see also Richardson & Gullapalli, 
supra note 44, at A4 (reporting that hedge funds have sued the SEC over the rule 
requiring registration of hedge fund advisers). 
48. Rule 203(b) (3)-2, 17 C.F.R. § 203(b) (3)-2. 
49. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
50. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (Oct. 23, 2003). 
51. See, e.g., Detailed Comments of Business Roundtable on the “Proposed 
Election Contest Rules” of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/brt122203.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2005); see 
also Brett Ferguson, Snow Says SEC Proxy Access Rule ‘More Likely to Backfire’ Than 
Help, SEC. L. DAILY, May 24, 2005 (reporting that “industry experts have called the 
proposal ‘dead’”). 
52. See, e.g., Deborah Solomon, Michael Schroeder, David Rogers & Diya 
Gullapalli, Cox’s Nomination to Run SEC Signals a Regulatory Shift, WALL ST. J., June 
3, 2005, at A1. 
53. See Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig. v. Enter. Mortg. 
Acceptance Co., 391 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2004); Foss v. Bear Stearns & Co., 394 F.3d 540 
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limitations for securities fraud private actions, the only provision of SOX 
that directly improves investors’ remedies for securities fraud, is not to 
be applied retroactively, thus depriving many investors of the 
opportunity to recover for injuries incurred because of the corporate 
scandals that led to SOX’s enactment.  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed 
the conviction of Arthur Anderson for witness tampering in connection 
with the government’s investigation of the Enron scandal.54  While the 
conviction was overturned because of faulty jury instructions, many 
blamed the Department of Justice for the demise of the accounting 
firm.55  Finally, while the government has been successful in achieving 
convictions in some well-publicized cases of corporate officers and 
securities professionals for corporate looting or other misconduct,56 other 
prosecutions were unsuccessful57 and call into question the ability of the 
jury system to handle these complex cases.58 
 
(7th Cir. 2005); In re ADC Telecomms., Inc., 409 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 2005); cf. Tello v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 410 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that extension 
could be applicable, but declining to decide the question until a more developed record 
determined when class members had inquiry notice). 
54. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005). 
55. See, e.g., Editorial, Arthur Andersen’s ‘Victory,’ WALL ST. J., June 1, 2005, at 
A20. 
56. E.g., Andrew and Lea Fastow (Enron); John and Timothy Rigas (Adelphia 
Communications); L. Dennis Kozlowski and Mark Swartz (Tyco); Bernard Ebbers 
(Worldcom); Martin Grass (Rite Aid); Jamie Olis (Dynegy); and Frank Quattrone 
(CSFB).  See Executives on Trial: Guilty, Not Guilty, Mistrial, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, June 
21, 2005, available at http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,SB110995911259970823,00. 
html (some of these are currently on appeal; it is suggested that, in light of the reversal of 
Arthur Andersen’s conviction, Quattrone’s conviction may be set aside since the jury 
instructions were similar). 
57. Most notably, a jury acquitted Richard M. Scrushy, former CEO of HealthSouth 
Corp., of participating in a $2.7 billion accounting fraud, despite testimony from several 
former HealthSouth executives about Scrushy’s involvment as well as tape recordings 
that implicated him.  See Dan Morse, Chad Terhune & Ann Carrns, HealthSouth’s 
Scrushy is Acquitted, WALL ST. J., June  29, 2005, at A1. A few weeks earlier, New York 
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer’s failure to win a conviction of Theodore Sihpol was 
viewed by some as a cautionary tale of prosecutorial over-zealousness.  See Kara 
Scannell & Arden Dale, Sihpol Verdict Deals a Blow to Spitzer, WALL ST. J., June 10, 
2005, at A1 (describing acquittal as a “high-profile setback for Mr. Spitzer . . .”). 
58. Kozlowski and Swartz were each convicted of 22 counts in June 2005 after their 
first trial, which began in October 2003, resulted in a mistrial in April 2004.  See Mark 
Maremont & Chad Bray, Tyco Trial Jurors Say Defendants Weren’t Credible, WALL ST. 
J., June 20, 2005, at  A1.  Scrushy was acquitted of 36 charges, including the first charge 
brought under SOX reporting requirements, after a trial that lasted six months, where one 
juror was replaced for health reasons after deliberations had begun and the jury 
frequently communicated to the judge that it was deadlocked.  See Morse, Terhune & 
Carrns, supra note 57. 
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Investor Education 
Many investors are remarkably unaware of the degree to which they 
are responsible for their investment choices, even if those choices were 
influenced by their broker, and they are even less aware of basic 
principles such as the need for diversification, the degree of risk involved 
in equity investing and the lack of a broker’s duty to monitor the 
investor’s account on an ongoing basis absent special circumstances.59  
The high level of investor ignorance coupled with the mounting investor 
backlash suggests that the greatest hope for investor protection lies in 
investor education efforts.  The Investor Rights Project has been tackling, 
in small ways, the need for more investor education, especially with 
respect to conduct that may affect investors’ legal rights and 
responsibilities. Through grass-roots efforts at local libraries, community 
centers and AARP chapter meetings, our staff attorneys have been 
presenting seminars to individual investors, mostly elderly, on their legal 
rights and responsibilities when opening and maintaining a brokerage 
account at a securities firm. 
Despite our investor education efforts and our desire to continue 
them, we have reservations about their efficacy.  Professor Fanto, ever a 
passionate observer, despaired from the Symposium audience that after 
studying investor education efforts,60 he too doubted their effectiveness.  
Instead, adopting a regulatory model of “conservative paternalism” 
looked better and better to him as the only solution to investor ignorance 
and abuse.  It is significant to us that the Global Analyst Research 
Settlement, touted by the regulators and the industry as a panacea for 
investor education deficiencies,61 has led to nothing but political 
 
59. See Applied Research & Consulting LLC, NASD INVESTOR LITERACY 
RESEARCH (2003), available at http://www.nasdfoundation.org/surveyexecsum.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 7, 2005) (reporting on results of 2003 survey of 1086 investors showing 
remarkable lack of knowledge regarding basics of investing).  This ignorance is not 
limited to unsophisticated investors.  See Peter G. Gosselin, Experts Are at a Loss on 
Investing,  L.A. TIMES, May 11, 2005; De Kwiatkowski v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 306 
F.3d 1293 (2d Cir. 2002) (reversing finding of liability of commodities broker whose 
currency trades on behalf of sophisticated investor lost hundreds of millions of dollars). 
60. See James A. Fanto, We’re All Capitalists Now: The Importance, Nature, 
Provision and Regulation of Investor Education, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 105 (1998). 
61. Joint Press Release, SEC, NASD, NYSE, NYSAG & NASAA, Ten of Nation’s 
Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest 
Between Research and Investment Banking—Historic Settlement Requires Payments of 
Penalties of $487.5 Million, Disgorgement of $387.5 Million, Payments of $432.5 
Million to Fund Independent Research, and Payments of $80 Million to Fund Investor 
Education and Mandates Sweeping Structural Reforms (Apr. 28, 2003), http://www. 
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infighting, institutional paralysis, and what appears to be a tremendous 
waste of time and money.62  In particular, the Investor Education Fund 
has disbursed high fees to lawyers and industry personnel to service a 
now-defunct entity that accomplished nothing, dollars that could 
otherwise have been spent in the trenches, convincing investors—one at 
a time if necessary—that securities industry players may not have their 
best interests at heart, despite their rhetoric, advertising, and fancy titles. 
The complete failure of the SEC’s Investor Education Fund crystallizes 
the lack of consensus on the best way to help investors. 
In light of this backlash, the ideals of the Symposium—to improve 
investor justice by highlighting the interplay of private and public law in 
areas impacting investors—seem ever more elusive.  Only with persistent 
investor rights advocacy, through groups such as the Investor Rights 
Project, will the voices of average, individual investors be heard. 
 
 
sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm. 
62. See, e.g., Deborah Solomon, What’s the Best Way to Invest in Teaching the U.S. 
to Invest?, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2005, at C1 (reporting on the dispute between federal 
and state securities regulators on how to spend the $55 million in investor education 
funds set aside by the analyst settlement); Randall Smith & Ian McDonald, Frustrating 
Venture: SEC Education Fund to Lose Top Figures, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2005, at C1 
(reporting on resignation of leaders of SEC’s investor education entity set up with analyst 
settlement funds); see also Application of Plaintiff SEC for Order Approving New 
Investor Education Plan, 03 Civ. 2937 (WHP) (on file with authors) (seeking approval 
from federal district court to dissolve SEC’s Investor Education Fund and to instead 
utilize already-existing NASD Investor Education Foundation to administer investor 
education monies, and notifying court of need to reimburse Investor Education Fund for 
its expenses). 
